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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is
comprised of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and
the Philippine Islands. This region strategically encom-
passes the primary route between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. Furthermore, it is rich in natural resources.
Consequently the U.S. has many national interests in the
ASEAN region. This paper describes those interests in four
categories: (1) Security, (2) Economic, (3) Political, and
(4) Social/Cultural. Some Washington policy-makers negoti-
ate U.S. interests bi-laterally with each individual nation
without regard for their grouping. Others deal regionally
through ASEAN. It is the intent of this thesis to analyze
the optimum route our planners should follow when negotiating
our policies and goals concerning this region.
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The objective of this thesis is to analyze the most effect-
ive means the United States government can undertake in dealing
and negotiating with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
referred to throughout this paper as ASEAN. The organization
of this paper will first determine the extent of United States'
national interests in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. This extent should indicate whether or not the Assoc-
iation plays a relevant importance in the policies and decisions
which Washington sets over this region. Thereafter suggestions
for future direction of U.S. national interests, either through
the Association, or outside it, will be provided.
II. METHODOLOGY
The above objective will be accomplished through a compar-
ative analysis, first by depicting the United States' interests
in this region, without considering the interests connected
through the Association, and then by analyzing those U.S.
interests connected through the Association. Prior to exam-
ining the specific U.S. position and ties with the Association,
a background summary of ASEAN, since its conception will be
provided. Once this foundation has been established, the
specific interests of the United States outside of ASEAN will

be discussed in four catagories for each country: (1) Sec-
urity, (2) Economics, (3) Politics, and (4) Cultural/Social.
Following that, a similar presentation describing U.S.
interests dealt through ASEAN, in the same four catagories,
will be developed. From this analysis, the two summaries
will be compared and conclusions as to the relevant importance
of ASEAN in American decisions over the U.S. interests in
this region will be drawn. This in turn will provide a means
for policy- and decision-makers in Washington to maximize
their dealings with this region in future negotiations, ie.
to deal with the respective nations unilaterally or with the
Association as the regional representative.
III. BACKGROUND
In August 1967, five Southeast Asian Nations, who were
facing similar economic and security dilemmas, concluded that
it would be mutually advantageous to pool their resources into
a regional organization. (The declaration to form this union
is presented as Appendix A) . This organization assumed the
title of the Association of South East Asian Nations or ASEAN.
Its membership is comprised of (1) Thailand, (2) Malaysia,
(3) Singapore, (4) Indonesia, and, (5) the Philippine Islands.
ASEAN is unique from other regional international organ-
izations such as the European Economic Community (EEC) or the
Organization of American States (QAS) , in that its members'
have vast cultural, ethnic, and linguistic variances. Instead

these countries have pronounced differences in those very
aspects for which they united to promote (such as political,
social, and economic structures). In the past, these differ-
ences created territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts, religious
prejudices, and mistrust between the five nations. However,
each recognized its inability to solve these conflicts on a
bi- or raulti- lateral basis, so the organization seemingly
provided a forum whereby the intra-regional differences could
be discussed, mitigated, and hopefully even resolved. Further-
more, ASEAN now serves as a basis to minimize each nation's
feeling of insecurity and provides strength in economic
bargaining throughout the world.
It appears that this association was formed as a second
attempt of a similar effort to unify the region through a pact
in 1961. In this first case, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand formed what became known as the Association of South-
east Asia CASA) . This initial group unity failed primarily
because of a territorial dispute over the Malaysian state of
Sabah between Malaya and the Philippines. In the mid-sixties,
the formation of ASEAN served to minimize manipulation or
domination by any of the world's major powers through their
regional cooperation. It preserved these states' desires to
"J. M. Vanderkroef, "The New Southeast Asia," Contemporary
Reading, 231: Nov. 77, pp. 245-251.

remain clear of reliance upon either the Communist Bloc or
Capitalist influences.
This attempt at non-alignment was clearly set forth in a
declaration by the ASEAN nations in November 19 71. The
initiative came primarily from Malaysia; endeavors toward
neutralization had begun there early in 1968, mainly in re-
sponse to a new situation being created by the British military
withdrawal. Peter Polomka, an Australian journalist, outlined
the three elements contained in this neutralization as: (1)
a guarantee by a major powers, thought to be China, the Soviet
Union and the U.S., to not interfere in the internal affairs
of South-East Asian states; (2) a state of neutrality and a
non-aggression pact by the states within the region; and (3)
the maintenance of national stability and co-operation within
the region.
Each nation has its own basis or reasons for its respective
cooperation within this regional association and, while security
and economics remain the primary concepts , each respective
member possesses varying degrees of interest in those aspects,
dependent upon its own unique situations and goals presented
by its government elitist structure. Although the five ASEAN
countries have always proclaimed economic, political, and
cultural cooperation as their banner, the perceived threat
Adelphi Papers Number One Hundred and Four: "Indonesia's
Future and Southeast Asia." International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies, Spring 1974, p. 26.
10

from Vietnam in the short term, and possibly China and Russia
in the long term, was the regional grouping's real reason for
the diligent rally during a Bali summit meeting in February
1976. That meeting had been called in the wake of the Com-
munist takeovers in Indochina the year before. In fact, at
that time, the 'domino theory' was prevalent in the minds of
most ASEAN nations' rulers. These anxieties were confirmed
by the steady string of accusations from the USSR and Vietnam
that ASEAN was purely a military alliance set by the United
States
.
Some of the hostility and apprehension was alleviated in
1978 when China began to express friendship and solidarity
with the five nations. Then in June 1978, when the ASEAN for-
eign ministers were gathering at Thailand for the annual
meeting, Vietnam suddenly dropped its heretofore hostile
4
attitude towards the association. This was done possibly to
gain some economic concessions from this region such as oil,
or could even have been done to alleviate the ASEAN region
from forming a military alliance to counter the Vietnamese
aggression into the region.
There is another agreement linking the ASEAN countries
with the West which still has importance: the Manila Pact.
^J.M. Vanderkroef, "ASEAN and U.S. Security Interests,"
Strategic Review
,
Vol. 6, Spring 1978, pp. 153-155.
4Rodney Tasker, "A Quest For Peaceful Coexistence," Far
Eastern Economic Review, February 29, 1980, p. 8-9.
11

This agreement was a security arrangement drawn up in 1954 to
link the Thai's by treaty with the United States, Australia,
Britain, New Zealand, and the Philippines. (Two other sig-
natories, Pakistan and France, have since withdrawn). The pact
is a pledge by members to consult each other whenever any of
the other territories are threatened. (The relevance of this
pact will be further examined when the interests between the
U.S., Thailand, and the Philippine Islands are discussed.)
ASEAN initially expressed the desire to remain outside
the influence of any single power, either Communist or non-
Communist. All the countries, other than Thailand, have had
a past history of such domination when they were colonies of
European powers. However, there is now a total consensus
within the association that the United States should display
a more substantial presence in the region as a counter-balance
to the expansionist Communist powers surrounding the northern
and eastern borders of the region. The U.S. has already
established stronger economic ties with the area than has the
Soviet Union, China, or Vietnam through trade and investment.
Furthermore, there are signs from the ASEAN countries that
they would also like more visible indications of an American
military and political commitment to the region. Having
Rodney Tasker, "A Useful Role For Superpowers," Far
Eastern Economic Review
,
Feb. 29, 1980, pp. 11-12.
^V.G. Kalkarni, "Despite U.S. Airlift of Arms, Thailand
Still Frets Over More Powerful Viets," Christian Science Monitor ,
July 22, 1980, p. 18.
12

presented a brief background o£ the Association, this essay-





U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ASEAN 'S MEMBERS
I. SECURITY INTERESTS
For most of the last decade there has been an obvious
downplay of U.S. involvement in the region of the ASEAN na-
tions, even though Washington has strongly denied this neglect.
The downplay is a natural reaction to the debacle America
faced in Vietnam. Recently the U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia and the Pacific, Richard Holbrooke, said
during a press conference: "America has ended its period of
drift in this region. We are, and we will, remain a Pacific
7power and Asian power." Evidence of this involvement may be
most obviously supported by noting the substantial increases
in the U.S. military assistance and sales in the most recent
years. Also notable are efforts of the Americans during the
resettlement of nearly 200,000 Indochinese refugees in 1978
and 1979.
ASEAN formed in 1967. Both before and since that date the
United States has shown involvement and concern in the security
aspects of that region. In nearly all instances Washington
D.C. has linked the security concern to the American anti-
expansionist and 'free world' theme profferred by our nation
since its conception; The first involvement was a U.S. con-
7Rodney Tasker, "A Useful Role For Superpowers," Far
Eastern Economic Review, p. 12.
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frontation with Spain in the Philippines in the late 1800' s.
Following the Spanish-American War, the islands were ceded to
the United States by Spain under the Treaty of Paris on Decem-
ber 10, 1898. Following World War One, the United States
joined with the major powers to limit the sizes of the navies,
partly in an effort to affirm its then growing interests in
the Pacific. During World War Two, the United States and her
allies waged an expansive island hopping campaign to repel the
Japanese expansion in the Pacific. The reasoning behind the
United State's policy of the 1950' s was to involve itself with
the countries of the region through pacts such as the Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) . Each agreement ^^/as part
of the crusade against Communism during the cold war period.
Bruce M. Russett, writing for the Southeast Asia Development
Advisory Group of the Asia Society, explained the American
policy of pacts in the region during this period:
For Americans, it is clear that these
groupings (functional groups, regionally
focused) have a double purpose, and this is
especially true in Southeast Asia. They
hope that these functional efforts will in
time develop into areas of regional solid-
arity capable of providing, at least implicitly,
»
a basis for collective defense and containment.
The United States has long recognized the strategic import-
ance of ASEAN: The five members of the association lie roughly
in a rectangle 3200 miles east to west and 2200 miles north to
o
"Singapore's Strategic Role Looks Vulnerable," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 101, 11 August 1978, p. 66.
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south, and, with the exception of Thailand and Malaysia, all
of the nations are composed of islands. Also the region is
located in the most direct and obvious passage between the
Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Indonesia, on the southern border of the region, is com-
posed of over 3000 islands and is the world's largest
archipelago. It is the third largest nation of Asia and the
fifth most populous nation of the world; the Eastern border
of the region is made up of over 7000 islands known as the
Philippine Islands. Malaysia is a peninsula which extends
from the mainland of Asia to the islands of Indonesia and was
once part of a land mass reaching almost to the continent of
Australia. Thailand is the only ASEAN state located on the
mainland Asia and has extensive boundaries with non-ASEAN
nations. Singapore, the smallest in the grouping, is a 250
square mile island located at the southern tip of Malaysia.
The strategic importance of the ASEAN region is mainly
due to the geographical position, for the waters between the
Malay Peninsula and Indonesian Archipelago form a choke point
or funnel for the majority of the shipping between two oceans.
In fact, more than 1,000 vessels pass through the Strait of
9Malacca alone each week.
This shipping takes place primarily through three channels
of water: the Strait of Malacca, the, the Sunda Strait,
^Rodney Tasker, "Reinforcing Ties With ASEAN," Far Eastern
Economic Review, Sept. 23, 1977, pp. 125-128.
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and the Lombok Strait. (See Appendix B for a map of the
area.
)
The recent influx of Soviet influence into Indochina and
potential desire for use of the harbors and airfields, (not
only of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam but of other parts
of the region for projection of Moscow's power and influence)
has not gone unnoticed by Washington. The U.S. has a vested
interest, along with Japan and other nations, to see that the
right of free passage is maintained through ASEAN' s straits.
Over the past decade this interest has become accentuated with
the growing importance of Mid-east oil and the security aspects
surrounding that area.
In addition to the strategic position of the region it is
also important to take into account that the region has abun-
dant indigenous natural resources which include oil, tin,
bauxite, rubber, copper, and numerous other minerals and
agriculture products. In 1976, economist Allan E. Goodman
of the National Defense University, noted that two of nine-
teen major strategic materials imported by the United States
relied on ASEAN sources. These were tin and natural rubber.
Over 70% of these two resources were from this Asian region.
However, both Western Europe and Japan rely quite heavily on
the ASEAN region for many of these same nineteen strategic
17

resources. (See Appendix C for a complete listing of these
resources)
.
Both the strategic location, and the abundance of natural
resources pose a threat to the region in terms of an external
power or powers desiring control over the area through overt
military and economic pressures. Besides this problem, each
nation is threatened from within its borders by insurgent
efforts either by external support or by political factions
within the nations. These threats appear to pose at least
as large a concern for ASEAN leaders as do those alien forces
external to their borders. In fact, they are more important
to counter in the short term. It is these internal threats
which have demanded many of the types of armament being pro-
cured by these five nations, especially counter- insurgency
operational equipment.
A. U. S. Security Interests in Singapore
With the Communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos, in Southeast Asia, Singapore's defense policy has nec-
essarily changed over the past decade. Formerly, Singapore
relied heavily upon Malaysia and Britain for its external
security, but, in 1971, Singapore signed a joint defense pact
with Britain, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand to replace
the British responsibility.
Allan E. Goodman, "The Threat from the Third World:
Mounting Challenge to U.S. and West Europe Superiority?", in
Proceedings of the National Security Affairs Conference July
17-19, 1978, National Defense University Equivalence, Suffi-
ciency and the International Balance, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 186.
18

Domestically, the only external threat to Singapore
comes from the Chinese Communist guerillas. To help mitigate
this threat, Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kwan Yew, gained
reassurances from the People's Republic of China in a 1976
visit. It was agreed the PRC would not interfere with Singa-
pore's internal affairs. Externally, Singapore feels that the
greatest threat to the region comes from the Vietnamese
expansion in the North. In fact Singapore, unlike the other
ASEAN members, has made overt verbal attacks against the
intrusion of the Vietnamese along the Thai-Cambodian border.
Singapore has a relatively small combined armed force
with only 36,000 regulars, but their area of responsibility
is also correspondingly small. Furthermore, the regulars are
backed by a 7,500 man police force and nearly 75,000 reservists
or home guard personnel. While Washington has never provided
any security assistance to Singapore, the U.S. was its biggest
supplier of military hardware from 1973-1977 ($110.2 million).
No Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits have been received by
Singapore from the United States since 1969.
Singapore has increased its export oriented industries
in the past several years. In fact in 1976, that nation
exported $20 million worth of military equipment. They are
one of ten countries approved by our government for co-
production and co-assembly of M-16 rifles, and have begun
DMS Inc. Market Intelligence Report 1980, Australasia
Section, Singapore Summary, pp. 2-3.
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producing weapon sight devices, communication/electronic
equipment and military vehicle engines on a large scale. They
have also procured 40 ex-U.S. A-4 fighter aircraft with ex-
tensive modifications, 20 UH-IB helicopters, support for
their F-5E aircraft, Hawk AD missiles, numerous armored
personnel carriers, and tanks. (More recently Singapore has
shown interest in Isreal's C-2 Supersonic jet fighter.) Her
ability to construct surface craft is noteworthy. Singapore
has constructed several fast attack craft and patrol boats
recently. Her port is the fourth largest in the world and
she services nearly 40,000 vessels annually. Singapore's
construction of patrol boats is primarily for export. The
Singapore government also signed a contract with Moscow to
12
repair Soviet ships and has done so since 1977.
Singapore's arms procurement suggest that she has
placed more priority over defense of ASEAN than over domestic
instability. It is inefficient to combat insurgents with high
performance jet aircraft, missiles, and armored tanks on a
225 square mile island, for one might well assume these
sophisticated items would be better suited against an out-
side agressor.
B. U. S. Security Interests in Indonesia
The United States recognizes the strategic importance




this island nation is positioned so as to control the main
waterways between the continents of Australia and Asia.
Second, discoveries o£ more oil reserves in her territorial
waters have increased each year.
The United States has long recognized Indonesia as a
1
3
stabilizing force in the Southwest Pacific region. In 1965,
Indonesia turned strongly ant i- Communist when the PKI, the
oldest Communist party in Asia, attempted an abortive coup to
overthrow the government of then-President Sukarno. The
result of that incident was the purging and slaughter of
nearly 100,000 Communists and Communist sympathizers in that
nation. Indonesia had been one of the largest importers of
arms from 1958-1965 with its chief supplier being the Soviet
Union, but following the 1965 Communist purge, the Indonesian
government found itself holding a military arsenal for which
there was no source of spare parts. From necessity, the
nation began to replace its arsenal with arms from the Western
nations, and the United States in particular began contributing
heavy military assistance. Until 1978, the U.S. maintained an
82 member Military Assistance Group after which time it was
reduced to 54 personnel. As of 1977, the United States
13 Philip Habib, Statement on "Shifting Balance of Power
In Asia: Implications For Future U.S. Policy," to Committee




Congress had appropriated $141.4 million for the military-
assistance program. Other major projects under America's
Military Assistance Program (MAP) to Indonesia have included
installation of command and operational communications equip-
ment, replacement of antiquated equipment, provision of
certain radios and vehicles, and maintenance support of U.S.
manufactured equipment. MAP cost the U.S. around $15 million
annually. As of 1978, the Carter administration attempted
to eliminate the Military Assistance Program in all but a
few countries and instead compensate by increasing Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) . Washington's State Department officials
have been quick to emphasize to Jakarta that elimination of
Indonesia's MAP funds is not unique to them, but there is an
on going, across-the-board reduction in worldwide MAP funds.
Indonesia is the only ASEAN country which has a basic
aircraft industry. Thus, far it has assembled only aircraft
for military use, however, there is a viable potential that
it can expand this into an economic asset to supply both
domestic and foreign requirements. There have been orders to
supply their military aircraft to Thailand, Malaysia, and
the Philippines. Further, the Indonesians have entered into
a co-production agreement with France's Aerospatiale to pro-
duce SA-330 Puma helicopters, and this would allegedly create
''^DMS Inc. Market Intelligence Report 1980, Australasia
Section, Indonesia Summary, pp. 4-5.
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a transfer of technology to Indonesia and technical training
of Indonesian personnel. In 1978 and 1979, Indonesia placed
orders for 16 F5 aircraft, a transfer from Israel of 14 F4E
attack aircraft, and three Lockheed L-100-30 Super Hercules
aircraft. Besides the actual aircraft, and perhaps even more
significant, are the contracts for special modifications to
ordered aircraft; these would include jettisonable fuel tanks
and transponders for the F-5 aircraft. The modifications
would increase the range and capabilities of those aircraft.
Currently in Indonesia's navy only those vessels which
have been obtained from sources other than the Soviet Union
can be maintained in active duty, therefore, they must recon-
struct and replace their obsolete non-supportable Navy. The
plans call for emphasis on expansion and modernization of its
major and light displacement warships and small force of sub-
marines. While the U.S. may be able to provide a quantity of
light displacement craft, it must be considered that Indonesia
also has a shipbuilding capability. Furthermore, South Korea -
presently a strong contender in the building of fast patrol
boats - has filled an order for four patrol craft for Indonesia.
The Army has begun to modernize through the purchase of
of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and trucks, to upgrade







accessories for their standard troop assault weapon. There
is also a firm commitment for an M-16 production factory to
be built in Indonesia, confirmed by Vice President Mondal '
s
17
visit to Jakarta in May 1979.
Most of what the Jakarta government has purchased is
designed for the purpose of strengthening its defenses against
possible Communist insurgency. This means investing in
counter- insurtence and surveillance items such as helicopters,
small high speed coastal craft and sophisticated electronics
equipment. In 1979/1980, the defense budget was doubled to an
amazing $3 billion of a total national of $11 billion. The
government has plans to double its force size from approxi-
mately 250,000 personnel to nearly 500,000. The reason for
this massive rebuild is stated as threefold: first, to deter
further expansion by Vietnam into ASEAN; second, to squelch
an internal fear of an Iranian style revolution; and third,
to counter the ever-present fear of domestic Communist insur-
18gent moves. I propose a fourth subtle reason for this
expansion - it would act as a means to stimulate the economy
and provide state funded employment for its young men. The
heretofore high unemployment and illiteracy rate by the
•^Ibid.
'^DMS Inc. Market Intelligence Report 1980, Australasia
Section, Indonesia Summary, pp. 1-13.
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youth would be partly combated through mandatory conscription
which would train and politically socialize the youth at an
impressionable age.
C. U. S, Security Interests in Thailand
Thailand, like her fellow ASEAN sisters, has both
internal and external threats. The internal threats are pri-
marily from two sources. The first is a group of roughly
3,000 bandit insurgents called Communists along the Thai-Malay
border who conduct guerrilla raids against the two nations;
but there is good cooperation between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok
in controling them. The second and perhaps more serious
internal threat comes from operations against the nation con-
ducted by the Pattani United Liberation Organization. This
faction is a predominantly Muslim group attempting to act as
an independent state within Thailand, and is a nearly 7,000
man guerrilla force.
The external threat facing Thailand looms strongest
above all else. The entire Thai Army of 145,000 is greatly
outmanned by the 160,000 Vietnamese battle-hardened forces
along their Cambodian/Laotian border. Furthermore, Hanoi
has nearly one million men in its standing army. The highly
publicized U.S. military airlift in early July 1980 has done
little to offset this large military imbalance, for
"All that the touted U.S. airlift brought in was 18 howitzers
(105 mm), 38 recoilless rifles (106 mm), 1,000 assault rifles
25

19(m-16) , and ammunition to go with them." Thirty-five tanks
(M-48) and more ammunition and artillery followed in August,
all being a part of a $40 million military aid package agreed
20
to by Washington. While additional and stronger U.S. support
is possible in terms of air strikes and troops if Hanoi attacks
Thailand, it would require the U.S. President to overcome dom-
estic opposition to waging another battle in Asia.
The United States has been the chief supplier of arms
to Thailand. From 1973-1977, the U.S. supplied over 80% of
all arms delivered there; the U.S. provision for education
and training of Thai military personnel is roughly $850,000
for 1980 and 1981. MAP funding, while on the decline before
1980, is projected to begin rising again in 1981. Further-
more, the U.S. still keeps a Joint U.S. Military Advisory
Group (JUSMAG) located in Bangkok, staffed with about 50 per-
1 21sonnel
.
Thailand is also beginning to build her arms industry,
but thus far only producing non- sophisticated weaponry and
ordnance. However, there have been signs of cooperation be-
tween herself and other ASEAN countries in developing joint
V.G. Kulkarni, "Despite U.S. Airlift of Arms, Thailand
Still Frets Over More Powerful Viets," Christian Science
Monitor
,
22 July, 1980, p. 18,
Ibid.
^^DMS Inc. Market Intelligence Report 1980, Australasia
Section, Thailand Summary, pp. 3-5.
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arms manufacturing businesses (such as a recent agreement with
Singapore to produce seven types of arms and ammunition com-
22
mon to both nations in the near future.)
As mentioned previously, the United States became
formally committed in a security arrangement with Thailand
and the Philippine Islands through the Manila Pact in 1954.
Even this relatively old agreement still has import-
ance today. Washington treats it as a valid agreement and
President Carter and former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
recently pledged to stand by the Pact in relation to our
commitment to Thailand within it. It was during the Vietnam
conflict that the United States had extensively staged assets
and invested military dollars in Thailand. The U.S. Air
Force based many of its B52 bomber forces, used against Viet-
nam, at U.S. air bases there. The last major utilization of
American assets in Thailand was during 1976, when the United
States Air Force helicopters were flown from bases in Thailand
to assist in the recovery of the U.S. commercial ship, Mayaquez
Relations with Thailand began to decline after the
U.S. pullout of South Vietnam. Historically, Thailand has
acted more as a power barometer for the region, nurturing more
cordial relations with whichever country was more in line with





is partly attributable for the Thai's strengthening coopera-
tion within the Association through which she felt the regional
unification against Communist expansion was her most sensible
direction
D. U. S. Security Interests in the Philippine Islands
The United States has probably invested more heavily
in the Philippine Islands than any other ASEAN nation. The
extent of this investment is understandable when one considers
the historical relations and close traditional ties the U.S.
holds with these islands. The U.S. security perspective as
concerns the Philippines is important for two primary reasons.
Primarily, there is both a mutual Defense Treaty dating from
1951 and the 1954 Manila Pact which binds the United States
to provide defense assistance to this nation in the event of
necessity. Secondly, there are American naval and air bases
in the Philippine Islands which are an integral part of our
presence in Asia. This presence is recognized as important
not only by the Philippines, but also by other Asian neighbors
and was formalized by a seperate Military Bases Agreement
dating from 1947. According to Admiral John S. McCain Jr.
(retired), the leaders of both the U.S. and Philippines agreed
that the American bases are essential to the maintenance of
an "effective U.S. presence in the Western Pacific in support




the region." He further stressed the United States must
recognize that the Philippines control the eastward approach
to one of four of the great bottlenecks to world sea trade
(the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, Strait of Gibraltar,
and the Panama Canal) . He also emphasized that the Philippine
Islands are presently our farthest forward outpost in helping
keep open the sealanes which we use to transport vital strate-
gic materials.
The Philippines' planning in regard to their military
doctrine concentrates on countering their internal threat of
domestic insurgencies. In this area they are presently
facing two crises: A battle against the New Peoples' Army
in the north - a Maoist group, and an externally supported
Muslim group in the southern islands around Mindanao. This
Southern insurgency has thus far resulted in roughly 50,000
casualties in only six years whereas the Communist insurgency
by the Maoists is presently at a lower key but could poten-
tially pose a greater threat in the long run.
The Philippines place little concern to external
threats primarily because they are able to depend heavily on
the deterrence created by U.S. presence in their country.
Adm. John S. McCain Jr. (ret). Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Future Foreign Policy, U.S. Government Printing




Despite many infractions which occurred during the Carter
Adminstration between the two nations over the human rights
violations in the Philippine Islands, the Manila government
recognizes the importance of this deterrence and is trying
to create a new basis to continue a healthy relationship
with the U.S.
There is a Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in the
Philippines comprised of 54 personnel which has primarily a
liaison function in all U.S. Military sales matters. From
1946-1974, the .^erican Congress legislated over $1416 mil-
lion to the Philippines in MAP, FMS
,
grants, education, and
other such assistance. And, since 1977, the major procure-
ments from the United States have included helicopters, patrol
25boats, trucks, armored personnel carriers and small arms;
these items are obviously intended to bolster the counter-
insurgency efforts. Prior to their latest procurements, the
Philippines purchased many items which could be intended for
the defense of the nation from external forces (ie. fighter
aircraft, transport aircraft, frigates, mine-sweepers, tanks
air-to-air/surface-to-air missiles). The primary supplier
has always been the United States.
Not all agree to the Washington policy regarding mili-
tary assistance and bases in the Philippines. The former
25
DMS Inc. Market Intelligence Report 1980, Australasia
Section, Philippines Summary, pp. 4-6.
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Foreign Secretary and Senator of the Philippines and now
President of the Movement for a Free Philippines opposed this
policy during a Congressional Sub-Committee hearing. He
characterized the U.S. support for the unstable and illegit-
imate island's government under President Marcos, as both
confusing and demoralizing to the Filipino citizens. He also
criticized the U.S. for allowing itself to be coerced into
a defenseless corner by staking out support to a government
which will not survive. Therefore he suspects the Filipino
population will hold America in low esteem in the future.
He claimed, furthermore that the U.S. policy for supporting
only governments which are conscious of human rights for its
26
citizens is a hollow, empty gesture.^ (On this point I
fully agree, as his stance demonstrates that the U.S. State
Department has continued to consider real issues as opposed
to idealistic views)
.
Considering the international situation with the Iran/
Iraq war, the Afghanistan invasion and the Vietnamese push
along the Thai border, the strategic position of the Philippine
Islands becomes even more prominant. While President Marcos
does violate many basic human rights issues, he knows the
U.S. will necessarily tolerate a fair amount of such action
because she needs the bases she holds in their nation.
" Raul S. Manglapus, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on




Perhaps as a threat, the Soviet Union has been showing close
attentiveness to the wife of the President, Imelda Marcos,
27
with some success. Diplomatic relations have been estab-
lished with both the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. here. The obvious
intent of all this is to create the illusion of a non-aligned
state to the third world, which is not easy to do considering
the umbilical relationship she has with the United States.
Perhaps one of the most significant shifts in the Philippine
defense doctrine is the apparent strengthening of ties between
Manila and the other four ASEAN capitals regarding policy,
joint defense production, and counter- insurgency cooperation.
E. U. S. Security Interests in Malaysia
From 1947 to 1960, Malaysia, with strong British sup-
port, waged a tough battle against the Chinese supported
Communist insurgency which threatened her fragile government.
Only since the British relinquished control has Malaysia
begun to take an active self-interest in "repelling the in-
surgent threats to her integral sovereignty. In fact, in
1979, she joined forces with Thailand in a joint effort to
destroy the Communist supported guerrillas along their common
border.
Malaysia called for regional neutrality and even sug-
gested China, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos join ASEAN at the
close of the Vietnam war in 1975, At the same time Malaysia
DMS Inc. Market Intelligence Report 1980, Australasia
Section, Philippines Summary, p. 9.
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appears to be taking positive steps to build a viable force
capable of repelling both internal and external threats to
her security.
News of a U.S. $645 million Air Force base to be built
on the east coast of Malaysia is thought to be an indication
of her preparation against the threat of a new Vietnamese
military adventure in that region. Included in the plan was
the intent to buy 80 American-made A4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers;
this purchase is being further studied. The U.S. has denied
however that the new 3,000 acre base is designed as a part of
2 8
contingency plans for American presence in Malaysia. It
does confirm that this vulnerable nation appears to have
shifted to a more alert position against the possible threat
from the Soviet Union dressed up as a Vietnamese. Still,
Malaysia's main security problem lies in containing the con-
tinuing Communist supported insurgency in the Jungles along
its northern Thai border; it is this internal threat which
is helping Kuala Lumpur to shape its weapons inventory and
force structure.
While no exports have been negotiated to date, Malaysia
has a fledgling arms manufacturing capability for they have
begun assembling German assault rifles and some ordnance.
They have also purchased some fighter aircraft, large trans-
ports, helicopters, high-speed coastal gunboats, armored
90
" K. Das, "Malaysia: Starting the Decade with a Bang,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 18, 1980, p. 30.
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cars and armored personnel carriers. Further, her plans
remain firm to purchase the aforementioned A4 Skyhawks in the
29
near future. Continued buildup and increasing cooperation
\vith the other ASEAN states over security matters is helping
to enhance the resolve of the region.
II. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
As we have seen, the economic importance the U.S. places
in the ASEAN region has been increasing each year, for U.S.
trade with East Asia since 1972 has been greater even than
with the European Common Market (EEC). The U.S. is considered
to be an important trading country to these nations, not only
in terms of our exports to the area, but also because our
industries are supported by an important and stable supply
of raw materials from that area. The strategic importance
of tin and rubber supply has already been discussed. Also
coconut oil and over eight percent of our petroleum imports
come from East Asia.
Since this region is one of the important sources of
certain types raw materials, many of these materials are sold
on the U.S. market. In the 1960's, the United States, by
means of the region's resources, met 85% of its demand for
natural rubber; 50% for tin; and 90% for jute and mica. These
quantities increased in the 1970' s. The past decade has been
^^DMS Inc. Market Intelligence Report 1980, Australasia
Section, Malaysian Summary, pp. 5-7.
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marked by expansion of American capital in Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Singapore and the total amount of U.S.
investments in 1975 was nearly 6 billion dollars. Also, U.S.
petroleum companies are actively exploring for and extracting
petroleum from Indonesia, Malaysia, and the sea shelves off
^u ^1 • 30their coastlines.
There are economic similarities among the members of ASEAN.
In fact, in 1976, the United Nations suggested that the ASEAN
countries adopt a common industrialization scheme in which
one industry of regional importance be assigned to each mem-
ber respectively, who would then manufacture its product for
the other four nations. After a substantial delay in implem-
enting this plan, caused by debate and settlement in the sel-
ection of acceptable industries, the program has finally been
launched. From this plan the following industry per country
is operational for the joint benefit of all:
A urea plant each in Malaysia and Indonesia;
a soda ash plant in Thailand; a diesel engine
production plant in Singapore; and a phosphate
plant in the Philippines.^!
A. U.S. Economic Interests in Singapore
Of all the ASEAN countries Singapore is by a large
margin the most developed and industrialized member. Her
^^I.B. Bulay: 'Washington's Plans Concerning ASEAN,"
U.S.A.: Economics, Politics, Ideology
,
p. 78.
^^Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN: Economics, The Key
Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 18, 1977, p. 33
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citizens enjoy a much higher standard of living than that of
any other country in Southeast Asia; the average per-capita
earnings being $7,500. Her 1978 GNP attained the mark of
$17.5 billion. Her per capita income is second in Asia only
to Japan. This nation has been declared a 'developed' country
by the International Monetary Fund, reportedly the first
33
'developing' country to achieve this redesignation.
With only limited raw materials and a small home
market, the Singapore economy is one of the most vulnerable
to international economic developments. However, she has pur-
sued capitalism in a powerful, yet controlled manner under
the positive leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.
According to James Strodes , during 1976, this nation's real
GNP grew an estimated 1% and was expected to continue to show
more growth as her non- industrialized trading partners began
to show economic improvement. In 1976, imports from the United
States exceeded $1,000 million, while exports to the U.S.
reached almost the same level. U.S. sales to Singapore are
expected to be favorable in such commodities as building and
construction supplies and equipment, metalworking machinery,
energy and fluid- transfer systems, communications equipment,
TO
D. Roosevelt, "Singapore-Stable Regime Seeks Change,"
Financial Times Survey, Nov. 26, 1979.
^ DMS Markets Inc. Intelligence Report, Australasia
Section, Singapore Summary, 1980, p. 2.
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process control laboratory instrumentation, food processing,
34
and materials handling equipment.
B. U. S. Economic Interests in Indonesia
Indonesia is becoming increasingly important in the
ASEAN region and the world. She has all the potential of a
leading regional power in Southeast Asia, and U.S. interests
are therefore substantial in a country of such size and signi
ficance. In terms of natural resources, she is rich in many
products such as natural rubber, rice, tin, coffee, and
tobacco. Her most important product, however, is oil which
she has only begun to exploit. Significantly, in Indonesia,
the American oil monopolies have invested $2 billion in oil
recovery. Indonesia is currently the third greatest supplier
of petroleum to the United States following only Saudi Arabia
and Nigeria. Indonesian oil has become even more pertinent
since President Carter halted oil imports from Iran in retal-
liation for the takeover of the American Embassy and the
Americans assigned to it being held hostage in November 1979.
Further, the United States is also interested in extracting
natural gas from Indonesia; in the northern part of Sumatra
T 1
James Strodes, "Washington Maps Out Its Asian Trade
Prospects," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 18, 1977,
p. 48.




and eastern side of Kalimantan, two plants are being construc-
ted for the liquification of Indonesian natural gas which
will be transported to America and Japan.
As the Honorable Philip Habib stated to the Sub-commit
tee on Future Foreign Policy during hearings in 1975:
Indonesia is important to the United
States for political and economic reasons,
and in the coming years the relationship will
be worthy of our most careful attention. . .
.
We expect to continue to provide some economic
and political assistance because of the Gov-
ernment's laudable efforts to emphasize
development and improve the well-being of the
people, and because generally speaking, their
revenues will not be sufficient to meet the ,_
needs of one of the world's poorer nations.
By 'Government's efforts', he was referring to the extensive
three-tiered, five year development plans, REPLITA I-III,
which were launched in 1970. These plans have the following
targets: (1) improve the food and clothing quality and avail-
ability for her citizens, (2) increase availability of the
required building facilities and housing, (3) expand and
improve the government infrastructure, (4) improve the wel-
•? o
fare program and, (5) improve employment opportunities.
C. U. S. Economic Interests in Thailand
Thailand is another well-endowed nation with natural




37 Philip Habib, Statement on "Shifting Balance of Power
in Asia: Implications For Future U. S. Policy" to the Com-
mittee on International Relations, Nov. 18, 1975.




ducer of basically primary products and is not dominated by
intensive capital industry. Her import of petroleum, iron,
automobiles, machinery, and other such goods testify to this.
The population is predominantly agrarian (with a variety of
agricultural products) and, therefore, Thailand is classified
as labor intensive. Because her lands hold so much promise
for increased yield in the respective agricultural products,
the labor intensive work force here provides a strong poten-
tial for becoming a major producer in the world of these
primary commodities.
Exports from Thailand grew with the increasing demand
for her products from the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe.
Exports to the United States are estimated to have exceeded
$3,000 million in 1976; imports from the U.S. are estimated
at about $430 million. More government emphasis is being
placed on irrigation on mining, signaling good potential for
U.S. sales of related equipment. This will help to balance
39the trade defecit the U.S. carries with that country.
D. U. S. Economic Interests in the Philippine Islands
Economic ties with the Philippine Islands are very
close. Traditionally there has been an annual tivo-way trade
close to two billion dollars. Additionally, in 1974, the
Laurel-Langley agreement expired and, thereby, ended the




period of exemption for American investors from restrictions
on certain business activities by foreigners in the Philippines
This also spelled the end of special tariff preference on
trade between our two nations. (This may partially explain
the unfavorable balance-of -payments experienced during the
1977 and since that time.) The 1976 imports from the United
States totalled nearly $700 million, while exports to the U.S.
were roughly $650 million.
As in other ASEAN countries, with the exception of
Singapore, the Philippines export a basic list of primary agri-
cultural products such as pineapple, copra, lumber, sugar,
and coconut oil. On the other side of the ledger, her imports
generally consist of products such as mineral fuels, petroleum
products, and machinery which will enable her to produce goods
for export. As noted by Shee-Poon Kim in an article covering
the first ten years of ASEAN existance, the U.S. remains a pri-
mary economic supporter of the Philippines despite a growing
concern over the instability of the pseudo-democracy being run
by President Marcos. Perhaps this instability has slowed the
influx of other international investment from what might have
been; certainly this nation has the natural resources and
40 Philip Habib, Statement to Subcommittee on Future For-
eign Policy, November 18, 1975, (U. S. Govt. Pringting Office).




labor assets necessary to become a major producer of
capital goods.
E. U. S. Economic Interests in Malaysia
Malaysia is considered a developing country with
abundant natural resources, high savings, an improving bal-
ance of payments surplus over the last five years, and
increasing levels of foreign reserves. She has become the
largest producer and exporter in the world of natural rubber,
tin, palm oil, tropical hardwoods, and pepper. While these
primary products account for 80-5 of her exports, Malaysia
has, nevertheless, managed to attain a rapid industrial growth,
In fact, between 1970-1977, her manufacturing output expanded
by over 12-5 each year. Despite this, there is very little
unilateral economic interplay between the United States and
Malaysia, nor is Malaysia conducting the majority of her trade
with other ASEAN countries. Instead, she is doing most of
her business with Japan by exporting almost three billion
dollars worth of goods to the Japanese islands and importing
almost 2.2 billion dollars in goods from there. She exports
only slightly less to the European Economic Community -
($2,813 million) - but imports considerably less -($1,678
million)
.
"^^Shee-Poon Kim, "Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977," Asia
Survey, August 1977, p. 755.
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As one looks at this region, it should be noted that the
U.S. interests and policies are not necessarily any distance
from aspirations and desires of the countries which form the
Association. Both politically and strategically, the United
States supports the sovereignty and independence of the non-
Communist nations of the region; that is probably the over-
riding U.S. interest and objective in the area. These policies
are directed toward maintenance of U.S. committments and U.S.
presence in the region, albeit, the presence in the Post-
Vietnam era is more modest than it once was. "The basic
policy in Asia is to cooperate with the Asian countries in
their search for peace and development, two factors which
are most on their minds, and to cooperate with the Asian
countries themselves who will fundamentally play the primary
44
role m this process."
Japan has expressed concern for the apparent disinterest
the United States has displayed in the last few years. She
would like to see the establishment of a stable international
framework for Southeast Asia in which Japan, the United States,
the Soviet Union, and China can each play constructive roles.
She views the ambiguity of U.S. policy in this region as
troublesome and perhaps this attitude is well-founded. In
44 . ^ .
Philip Habib, Statement to Sub-Committee on Foreign
Relations, November 18, 1975.
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an article written for the Far Eastern Economic Review by
Toru Yano in 1978, the following was expressed:
To stress the unimportance of Southeast
Asia to the U.S., one American participant
in a conference held in Honolulu in Mid-
January this year, described the region
as a 'small potato'. This conference on
Southeast Asia, attended by such significant
U.S. intellectuals as Edwin 0. Reischauer,
John K. Fairbanks and the like, provided
a good opportunity for forecasting the
drift of America. Although this Harvard
conference was made the most of by a
Japanese gaimusho (diplomat) , who delivered
a speech urging the U.S. to be more mindful
of its constructive role in Southeast Asia,
the Americans merely clapped their hands
courteously and, a moment later, forgot
the whole message. "^^
Under the political catagory, two recent situations arose
which have involved the policies of the United States with
individual countries of the association. The first concerns
the 1976 policy of President Carter over his human rights
issue. The second relates to the Law of the Sea as relegated
by the United Nations Conference (UNCLOS) which, in part,
applies to all nations' seaboard transit of this region.
In the first issue, the Philippines and Indonesia, have
been put under pressure to revise their policies regarding
Human Rights. The interesting fact is that both nations have
chosen to more or less ignore the pressures as applied by
President Carter's administration, apparently with no rebuke.
Toru Yano, "U.S. Inertia and the High Expectations of
Japan," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 10, 1978, p. 38.
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Thus, this has made the impression that the U.S. 'human rights'
program is little more than rhetoric. In one respect, their
refusal to be influenced on this issue may be more advantageous
than currently comprehended. If the U.S. were to impose her
standards for human rights upon these two nations whose gov-
ernments operate much differently from that of the U.S., then
perhaps these two Asian nations might decide to retaliate by
ceasing all cooperative relations with America; this is a sit-
uation we can ill-afford politically or economically.
In the second issue, over the right of passage through
these international waterways within this region, part of the
controversy over the use of the waters is indicative of the
trend of smaller nations asserting their 'rights' over more
powerful nations through means of International Law. As island
nations, both Indonesia and the Philippines have claimed that
the seas connecting their land members are territorial waters.
Singapore is caught in the middle by geography (since she is
at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca) and by economics (as
a major port in Southeast Asia whose bunkering and shipping
facilities depend on unimpeded access) . She noted that the
Indonesian/Malaysian assertion of control over the Strait of
Malacca is a hollow one, since neither state has the capability
46
of closing the passageway to outside powers.
Sheldon W. Simon, Asian Neutralism and U.S. Policy
,
Foreign Affairs Study No. 21, August 1975, pp. 44-46.
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In 1972, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Thomas Moorer, issued a statement regarding these
waterways which was later affirmed by both Japan and the Soviet
Union. This statement objected to what Indonesia and Malaysia
termed the "right of innocent passage." The reasoning was due
to the necessity of these waters to be kept open for inter-
national passage. Thus major powers, even as international
rivals, agree on the point that ' chokepoints ' such as these
straits, and island waterways between two oceans, must be open
for all nations to unrestricted passage in terms of economic
and security interests. It will be one of the major obstacles
for the UNCLOS to unravel if the conference is to have any
47
meaning in the coming decades.
Irrespective of one's evaluation of American politics in
this region, one point stands out clearly: the nations in
the five-member association are vehemently anti-Communist,
and regardless of what type of government they profess, or
how they conduct their policies, they should be considered
allies of the United States, Therefore, any uni- or bi-lateral
political motions in which we engage with them, should be
done as friends rather than as adversaries.
47
Leifer and Nelson, "Conflict of Interest in the Straits
of Malacca," International Affairs, (London), Vol. 49, No. 2,




In the last catagory, which is Cultural/Social interests
with the five nations, a number of crossover exchanges have
been evident. The most recent and major issue has been the
role in which the United States has played in resettling
nearly 160,000 Indochinese refugees since about 1977. While
America is not the only nation to be involved in this endeavor,
much of the financial aid and foodstuffs have been provided
by this country. The flow of refugees still has not abated.
There are approximately 14,000 Vietnamese per month being
resettled in the United States from Hong Kong, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. Furthermore, since the Vietnamese invasion into
Cambodia one and one-half years ago, 3.5 million Cambodians
have been displaced, many fleeing across the Thailand border.
U.S. and other assistance is nearly $300 million for this
48troublespot alone.
While the above situation falls under a U.S. foreign aid
status, there are other types of interaction, such as religious,
ethnic and educational, which take place between the United
States and these five nations and have no connection to the
ASEAN organization. For example, in Thailand there has been
an unusually large number of Christian Missionaries living
throughout the country working to instill Christianity in its
48John Yemma, "Displaced Persons Now Political Weapon,"
Christian Science Monitor, June 8, 1980.
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populace (the majority is Buddhist). According to LCDR Meiss
,
a son of one of these missionary families, the majority of the
efforts have been in the agrarian northern regions of Thailand
49
along the Laotian border.
The United States Peace Corps has been particularly active
in three of the nations, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Thailand. This organization involves a number of young
American personnel who volunteer for one or more years to work
in these and other foreign countries utilizing their particu-
lar skills to assist the population at the lowest levels.
They are paid a small portion of their salary; the remainder
is placed into their bank account in America which can be
drawn upon when their duty overseas is completed. The success
of this program has been greatly increased in the last decade
due to the manner in which it is conducted. It places the
personnel into the foreign culture at the same economic level
as the people with whom they will be working. They are pro-
vided with extensive language and cultural training prior to
being sent to their positions. Each member of the Corps is
initially a volunteer so enthusiasm is self-generated. It
is the opinion of this author that this has been one of the
49Conversations with LCDR Samuae Meiss, presently on
assignment at the Pentagon for OPNAV-06, Strategic Plans.
LCDR Meiss was raised in Thailand and speaks Thai fluently.
He and his family spent three years in the mid-seventies
assigned to the JUSMAG in Bangkok.
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most successful low cost assistance programs sponsored by
the United States to date.
There have been studies and projects ventured by the
U.S. and the five nations in social and scientific areas
which help to draw together the people of the nations and the
United States. For example, over the last eight years, the
Indonesian Institute of Sciences has sponsored a pair of
American Scientists to study the wild orangutan on Kalimantan.
Various scientific foundations within the United States have
supported this type of research in hopes of producing inform-
ation which will benefit all of mankind.
During the four years which I was in Asia for duty, I
encountered several Peace Corps volunteers in several countries
Their attitudes and the responses they produced in the popula-
tion of the areas in which they worked was most refreshing.
Presently there is one student attending the NPS who only
recently returned from a Peace Corps assignment in Malaysia.
^^B. Galdikas, "Living with the Great Orange Apes,"




UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ASEAN
The association was conceived and established in a tur-
bulent time in an area marked by intra-regional conflicts,
heavy American involvement in Indochina, and major power
rivalry in this region. Perhaps the five founding member
nations recognized each other's vulnerability and limitations
in facing the world; despite minor territorial disputes,
ethnic conflicts and animosities, religious differences and
economic difficulties, they decided to unite their resources
to promote stability and unity in the region.
Certainly during the initial years, America paid little
attention to the newly formed organization. Of course, the
focus of U.S. interest at that time was its involvement in
the conflict with North Vietnam. During that period the main
interest in the countries of this Association mainly concerned
whatever support these nations could provide to assist the
American military actions. Thailand and the Philippines were
most closely involved by their grants for U.S. bases as sup-
port and staging areas for the conflict.
While the move to establish ASEAN could also be expressed
as a step to identify more closely with other third world
nations, the members also took steps to improve relations with
the developed countries, particularly through their economic
49

relations. A greater emphasis was placed upon regionalism
as part of the trend toward self-reliance. In the more re-
cent years, this organization has begun to have greater meaning
The nations of ASEAN have begun to effectively exercise their
interactions as a unit and thus bring about advancement toward
their goals. Concommitently , the United States has come to
deal with this region more frequently through the association
rather than its former bilateral means.
I. SECURITY INTERESTS
Dealing with this region on security matters through an
association or regional organization is not a new concept for
the United States. Following World War Two, Southeast Asia
was an area of turbulent politics, revolts, and Communist
Aggression. Many nations expressed hopes that the United
States would take an active role in helping to stabilize the
region and to crush the traditional colonization of the area.
Although reluctant to do so, the U.S. seperated itself from
attempts to reinstate colonial rule, as in 1946, when she
rebuffed an attempt by France and Great Britain to form a
Pacific security pact. Washington, for the most part, con-
fined itself to granting independence to the Philippines and
chastizing the colonial powers as they attempted to re-estab-
lish their prewar holdings. Concurrently, India's Nehru
began active efforts at regional unity in the early months
of 1947 by forming the Asian Relations Organization. Through
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this group, Nehru proclaimed that unity was essential as the
colonialization receded. The first resolution passed by this
organization pressured the United Nations to resolve the dis-
pute between nationalists and the Dutch Army in Indonesia in
1949. The U.S. was forced to deal with this situation as a
52
member of the United Nations Security Council.
Following the collapse of the Nationalist government in
China in 1949, Philippine President Quirino suggested the ini-
tiation of a Pacific Security Pact to resist the Communist
threat. The American Congress incorporated a provision for
support of any regional security organization of non-Communist
Asian states into a Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.
The pledge of this type favored the development of some sort
of collective security agreement, with limited American
participation.
In 1950, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs, Dean Rusk, maintained that any Asian effort to pro-
mote economic welfare and regional security would be endorsed
by Washington. The State Department then proceeded on a bi-
lateral or multi-lateral basis to protect perceived U.S.
interests in Asia through the Philippines - U.S. Mutual
Defense Pact (30 August 1951) . The Australian-New Zealand-
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United States (ANZUS) Treaty (1 September 1951), and the Japan-
U.S. Mutual Security Pact (8 September 1951) were hastily
conceived to block the spread o£ Communism throughout Asia.
These agreements expressed the ultimate American goal to
develop a more comprehensive system of regional security in
the pacific.
In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
was created. Only two Southeast Asian nations, Thailand and
the Philippine Islands, comprised the original signatories.
However, as Russel Fifield pointed out in his 1958 study, the
fact that Great Britain signed automatically, meant the in-
clusion of Malaysia and British Borneo (soon to be incorpor-
ated within Malaysia); also, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam
were included in the treaty as protocol states. The pact,
therefore, had far more territorial significance than the
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roster of its membership indicated.
While many critics of SEATO compare the treaty to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , a study of the
1954 agreement points out that the Americans did not wish
SEATO to be an Asian NATO. Secretary Dulles rejected a simi-
lar unified military command structure, a joint command head-
quarters, a common strategy, and called for a SEATO standing
Russel J. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia :
1945-1958
,
(New York: Harper and Brothers), 1958.





force, the nations of which were key elements of NATO. The
U.S. position held that the Asian treaty would be used to halt
international aggression in any of SEATO's member states.
American involvement in SEATO was considered by Washington
to be a temporary measure. Russel Fifield brought this out
in his study of American involvement in S. E. Asia:
American support for security ... .was essen-
tially a holding operation until the states of
the area gained in internal strength and
external posture and worked together in broader
patterns of regional cooperation. . . The promo-
tion of good-neighbor relations, of regional
consciousness, and of regionalism was a broad
goal supported by U. S. policy.^'
Another organization established was the Economic Com-
mission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) . The Asians believed
this grouping would serve as a tool to procure economic aid
and recovery paralleling the Marshall Plan in Europe following
the Second World War. However, Great Britain and the United
States did not accede to the proposals presented by the group.
Instead they persuaded the underdeveloped nations to adopt
rhetorical programs such as expansion of exports, trade pro-
motion, training of manpower, institution of domestic savings
programs, and other such unrealistic moves for these troubled
nations. Nonetheless, ECAFE existed as the first united
grouping or front against the Western powers. By 1955,
Wright, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations..."
pp. 44-46.
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however, the creation of SEATO divided ECAFE into predictable
voting blocs (Western vs. Communist) and, thereafter, little
5 8
was achieved in the way of economic progress.
In 1959, the Prime Minister of Malay, Abdul Rahman, became
the proponent of another attempt at a regional organization.
In January of that year, Rahman proposed to the Philippine
President, Juan Carlos Garcia, that their nations initiate a
"Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET)". It
was to include only Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thai-
land, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. However,
Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma refused to enter and by 1961
only the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand remained interested;
consequently they formed the aforementioned Association of
Southeast Asia (ASA) . This organization was soon doomed due
to the territorial disputes which broke out between Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Indonesia. In fact, from 1963 until
Sukarno's downfall in Indonesia after the abortive communist
coup in 1965, an Indonesian campaign ensued in an attempt to
crush Malaysia. This campaign was known in Indonesia as
KONFRONTASI.^^ ASA was the last attempt by nations of the
region to establish an organization uniting them as a single
front facing the major powers of the world.
5 8Hiroshi Kitamura, Regional Cooperation as Seen From
ECAFE
,
(New York: The Asia Society- -SEADAG , 1972), pp. 9
51-52.




What this lengthy review affirms is that since World War
Two, the United States has repeatedly dealt with the Southeast
Asia region, and through one attempt or another, assisted and
supported the establishment of unified groupings between the
nations of the Southeast Asian region.
Today there exists a counterpart pact with which ASEAN
must consider itself a military contender. That is the Indo-
chinese triad of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea (Cambodia),
owned and operated by Hanoi and supported by Moscow. This is
not unlike the Warsaw Pact/NATO situation existing in Europe.
At this time ASEAN is not espousing itself as a military alli-
ance, but rather as an economic and social cooperative grouping
The major question now is whether these five nations will in
fact become an overt, full scale military alliance. As brought
out earlier, there has been some military cooperation between
the members such as between Malaysia and Thailand in battling
the insurgents along their common border. Singapore openly
called for the association to create a formal military alli-
ance when Afghanistan was invaded.
There appears to be a feeling of despair within the Assoc-
iation in regards to forming a military alliance. Thailand's
Deputy Foreign Minister recently stated that "Even if (ASEAN)
becomes a military bloc , it cannot do anything. Even NATO is
facing all kinds of problems. The five ASEAN members have
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less weapons than Vietnam. What is the use of making a mili-
tary pact?"^^
A major factor in ASEAN' s sovereign outlook is the area's
military ties to the United States. The confidence of this
region in the U.S. must have been shaken by the American with-
drawl in Taiwan and rhetorically proposed pullout of the 8th
Army from the Republic of Korea. American leaders, however,
have been attempting to reverse this feeling through policy
statements and accelerated delivery of military equipment to
Thailand. Despite these token appeasements, it is hard to
block out the feelings of doubt in the minds of ASEAN leaders
when they observe our ever dominant priority over Western
Europe and the shift of assets and protection from the Far
East to the Middle East over the existing crises around the
Persian Gulf.
That the ASEAN nations, even united, do not stack up
aganist the Vietnam counterforces is true. The requirement
for the U.S. security blanket is valid in order to either
deter or support a regional conflict. The U.S. may be able,
in part, to do this by increasing the supply of arms and
^^John C. Burton, "ASEAN Faces the Prospect of Military
Alliance," Defense and Foreign Affairs, August 1980, p. 13.
^""V.G. Kulkarni, "Despite U.S. Airlift of Arms, Thailand
Still Frets Over More Powerful Viets," Christian Science
Monitor
,
22 July 1980, p. 18.




other military equipment to ASEAN states. Most of the ASEAN
nations' equipment is obsolete or in short supply, there is
little attempt at standardization (a dilemma not unlike that
facing NATO) , and the forces of ASEAN are more suited to com-
bating insurgencies than facing an overt military threat.
Along with this lies another stumbling block: there is a
financial problem involved by those nations procuring arms
from the outside. They would naturally like to see more finan-
cial aid from Washington. But there may be a possible solution
or. trade-off option considering the extensive oil finds in
and around Indonesia and the existing crisis in the Persian
Gulf.
In a recent report from our Congress, it was noted that
"all of the ASEAN countries have, in the wake of the new
challenges they face, placed renewed emphasis on improving
their military capabilities. However, each ASEAN country
also continues to view economic and social progress as the
major factor affecting their long term stability and security.
Military modernization plans have, therefore, been moderate
and balanced to prevent resources from being significantly
diverted from economic development programs."
The defensive buildup among the five ASEAN nations has
been assisted by the development of domestic defense indus-
tries. It is one means of providing an in-house, cost-effec-






U.S. has not exploited this aspect very well. It has side-
benefits of providing technological gains for the respective
nations, profits through export sales, and a reliable supply
source since it is internal within the Association.
At present, the weakest common factor existing in the
ASEAN nations is the instability of each nation forced by in-
ternal unrest and insurgency against the respective regimes.
Even Singapore (which has managed to minimize the internal
threat through Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's strong direction
and ethnic cohesion) is still delicate since it is bracketed
by instability in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Since insur-
gency is a common threat (albeit not from the same sources)
perhaps the Washington planners would do well to place some
thought on how to best shore up the individual nations against
this unconventional type of warfare. Even better, this
assistance to the Association would provide a basis of coop-
eration and cohesion amongst the member states within the
organization.
A. U. S. Security Interests in Singapore Through ASEAN
Singapore initially disavowed the use of ASEAN for
any security aspect dealing with extra-regional powers. In
1969, her Foreign Minister, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, insisted
the organization remain clear of any defensive matters:
ASEAN should remain an organization solely
to promote economic cooperation in the region.
We should not burden it with responsibilities
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for sorting out the ideological complexion
of Southeast Asia or resolving its military
and security problems. ^'^
Yet by March 1971, Singapore's United Nations ambassa-
dor held that without some type of regional security apparatus,
ASEAN was powerless to act against the intrigues of a super-
power like Japan, who may be adamant on securing foreign
sources of supply:
Japan traditionally has had a very definite
policy toward the area in which she lives...
If her sources of raw materials, her markets,
or her sea lanes were threatened, this would
encourage her toward militarism. "5
Further, Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew recently publicly
urged American military forces to remain in Southeast Asia:
What we'd like to see is a balance of
powers in the region, or at least no prepon-
derance or overwhelming weight of any single
great power. As long as there is a Soviet
naval presence, that presence can only be
matched by an American naval presence. 66
To support what he preached, Premier Lee and his gov-
ernment agreed to permit U.S. maritime air patrols in the
Indian Ocean to use Singapore as a staging point. The U.S.
Navy P-3 ORIONS fly four monthly patrols, though the
Dick Wilson, The Future Role of Singapore
,
(London:
Oxford University Press , 1972)
,
p. 7T^
Yuan-li Wu, Strategic Significance of Singapore
,
(Wash-
ington D. C: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1972), p. 15.
Michael Richardson, "U.S. Sub Spotters Win Singapore
Assent," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 May 1978, p. 10.
59

frequency is likely to be increased as U.S. interest in the
Indian Ocean becomes more prominent. Singapore's military
airfield at Tengah is being used as a base for the patrols.
Even with these strong pro-United States statements,
Singapore's defensive posture remains unique, in that among
the ASEAN states, it alone receives no U.S. MAP funding. It
purchases whatever military hardware it needs on a cash basis,
including American aircraft and surface vessels, such as the
C-130 Hercules Transports and two ex-U.S. Minesweepers.
Her shipbuilding capability will likely preclude any future
purchases of vessels.
B. U. S. Security Interests in Indonesia Through ASEAN
Indonesia has been wary of any arrangement which
would call for any type of formal alliance or defense organiz-
ation structure. President Suharto stresses continually that
his country is non-aligned and has no ties with the great
powers. Indonesia's size and population tends to place it
into a position as a natural leader of the region and it could
potentially become a middle power of the world. In a speech
by President Suharto in August 1977, he pointed out that
"our strength is not a military strength, but one that is











69people of ASEAN...." The total military strength of the
forces in that nation has declined from 400,000 in 1967 to
270,000 in 1977, and many of those men are employed in civil
70
administrative duties. Concurrently, Indonesia's armed
forces undoubtedly depend on the Western bloc made evident
by the U.S. foreign military sales of $40 million to Jakarta
in 1979.'^-^
C. U. S. Security Interests in Thailand Through ASEAiN
Thailand's concept of mutual security in Southeast
Asia is the least consistent of all ASEAN nations. This is
probably due to its constant changes in government since 1973
and the neighboring threat of Communist forces form Indochina.
As usual, Bangkok will support whatever arrangement will en-
sure its survival. (This is not meant to sound like chastisement
of a seemingly logical policy) . After the fall of South
Vietnam, Thailand emphasized that ASEAN would first have to
seek accommodation with its northern neighbors. She remained
opposed to any evolution of ASEAN into a mutual security
organization from March 1976 to October 1976. Then in October
1976, a coup deposed Seni Promoj and in his stead, the military
^^Justus M. Van der Kroef, "ASEAN and U.S. Security
Interests," Strategic Review
,
Spring 1978, p. 55.
70David Jenkins, "Where Generals Reign Supreme," Far
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, 99, 13 January 1978, pp. 22-23.
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installed a vehement ant i- Communist regime. The Thai foreign
policy reversed itself and began to favor the idea of mutual
security in Southeast Asia. Bangkok then began pushing for
stronger ASEAN military cooperation. She invited U.S. tech-
nicians to prepare for P-3 flights monitoring Soviet naval
72
movements in the Indian Ocean.
In 1977, another coup resulted in a new face, and
General Kriangsak Chamanand, became the premier. His policy
has been to relax tensions with Hanoi and Phnom Penh. At the
same time, Thailand expressed a desire more vehemently than
any other ASEAN state, to strengthen her relationship with
73the U.S. (The 40 million dollars worth of military sales
from the United States mentioned earlier, certainly tends to
substantiate this.) Today the border conflicts with Laos and
Cambodia loom as strongly as ever. It is expected that as
long as the present regime holds power, and the threat remains
on these borders, Thailand will continue pressing for strong
ties with Washington.
D. U. S. Security Interests in the Philippine Islands
Through ASEAN
The ASEAN nation, which has traditionally and histor-
ically shown the strongest ties with the United States, is
now publically denouncing its special relationship with
72Van der Kroef, "ASEAN Security and Development: Some
Paradoxes and Symbols," Asian Affairs , 9 June 1978, p. 153-55.
73Rodney Tasker, "Wallflowers No Longer," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 100, 19 May 1978, p. 11.
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Washington. This is fairly recent as the Philippines main-
tained a pro-U.S. and ant i- Communist doctrine even after
President Nixon's visit with China. Following the 1973
American withdrawl from Indochina, they began to request
agreements for new bases. While negotiations over these
bases encountered some rocky paths, the Philippines began
suggesting that the association strengthen its internal aspects
on security.
The Human Rights rhetoric, displayed by the Carter
Administration, created some uneasiness between the two na-
tions for some time. Occasionally it surfaces again when
some Filipino or .%ierican interest group pulls it out to wave
in front of our policy-makers. In May 1978, Vice President
Mondale visited the Philippine Islands. President Marcos
conceded to our representative that the two bases at Clark
AFB and Subic Navy Facility "contribute to the mutual benefit
of both countries", and a four point agreement was put to-
7 5gether to deal with Philippine sovereignty. The Philippines
would stand to lose economically if the bases were closed, as
the total annual U.S. Initiated contribution to the national
economy is estimated at $200 million. Therefore, it is
74Van der Kroef, "ASEAN Security and Development: Some
paradoxes and Symbols," p. 153.
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doubtful the bases will ever be closed and the Americans
thrown off the islands.'
The commander of the U.S. Thirteenth Air Force. Major
General F. Poston, interviewed with the Far Eastern Economic
Review, in June 1978. He summarized security ties between
the U.S. and Philippines and how they relate with the other
ASEAN nations
:
I feel confident that President Marcos
recognizes the U.S. presence here as a
stabilizing factor in his region. And he
knows this feeling is shared by his ASEAN
partners . ^^
E. U. S. Security Interests in Malaysia Through ASEAN
Malaysia was the cornerstone to founding the original
doctrine of neutralization in the earlv years of ASEAN. How-
ever, from 1975, she favored altering ASEAN' s planned strategy
from defense to one of positive security. This change was
brought about by the Communist victory in Indochina in the
spring of 1975; Kuala Lumpar no longer considered the environ-
ment suitable for a neutralization scheme. Their government
stressed that cooperation in the region was paramount, but
were careful not to go so far as to establish any collective
security arrangement or formal military agreement between the
five nations. Malaysia already maintains two squadrons of
7 f\
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U.S. built supersonic F-5Es at an air base at Butterworth.
Also, as mentioned earlier, they plan to buy 80 American -made
A4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers.'
Malaysia appears to have now shifted to a more alert
position to the possible threat from the Soviet Union, espe-
cially through a Vietnamese proxy. However, in an article
in the Christian Science Monitor
,
it is reported that the U.S.
has supposedly encouraged Malaysia to seek accommodation with
79
Hanoi. Apparently the United States is not entirely sure
of its long-range objectives vis-a-vis Indochina, but does
not expect the return to power of the Pol Pot regime in Cambo-
dia. Right now the Americans are playing the Chinese Card
but that is not to say their dialogue with Moscow will not
be resumed within the near future. Therefore, it may be de-
sirable to 'help' Vietnam establish its independence from
both Moscow and possibly Peking in the future. In any case,
the Vietnamese stubborness regarding Cambodia, leaves the
members of the triple alliance (China-U. S . -ASEAN) with few
choices for diplomatic moves.
II. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
One aspect of ASEAN that has been a part of its primary
intent since the conception of the association, has been the
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goal to achieve economic growth and development. This region
has been traditionally one of the most poverty-stricken areas
o£ the entire globe. In 1974, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) listed the world's GNP at $4,820 billion. Southeast
Asia's portion of that total was a mere 1.43 percent, or $69
billion. At the same time, the region comprised approximately
8
8 percent of the world's population.
Poor nations of the world are frequently referred to as
"Less Developed Countries" (LDCs) , and have several traits
common to each other such as: poverty levels of income, a
high rate of population growth, low rates of adult literacy,
8
1
and a large agrarian work force. Except for Singapore, each
of the ASEAN states possess these characteristics. There are
other problems that exist which inhibit their growth such as
corruption, government inefficiency, low industrial capacity,
and little technical expertise. Since 1967, ASEAN has placed
acceleration of the economic growth as the first priority,
showing this region's concern to address the challenge which
is facing all LDCs. One dilemma of which all LDCs must be
aware, is a global economic trend indicating a widening per-
capita income gap between the developed countries and the
LDCs. Actually, by the mid-1970s, it was estimated that
8
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twenty-five percent of the world's population, in the devel-




While the past economic record of ASEAN has been less than
impressive, and is below the level it was to have attained
by this time, there nevertheless, has been a significant
change in the outlook by the region's policy and decision-
makers. The most important ingredient of international/re-
gional cooperation has thus been initiated. Today all five
members place the development of relations and cooperation
with their fellow members of ASEAN very high on the list of
economic priorities. Other organizations, such as the European
Economic Community, seem to have taken notice of the changing
attitudes within this Asian regional association.
A. U. S. Economic Interests in Singapore Through ASEAN
Singapore carries on a fairly well-balanced import/
export trade with the United States; in 1976, the total
amounts for each were roughly near $1,000 million. Her main
export is petroleum products. Among her other main products
are crude rubber, electric office machinery, telecommunication
equipment, ships and boats. In 1977, Singapore's Premier
Lee called for a dialogue between ASEAN and the United States,
8 2Milton H. Spencer, Contemporary Economics, 3rd Ed.
(New York: Worth Publishers, Inc.), 1977, p. 655.
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to expand favorable relations with America as a primary ex-
8 ^
ternal market.
B . U. S. Economic Interests in Indonesia Through ASEAN
The American business community reflects little under-
standing of the present Indonesian government and economic
situation. This is astounding in view of the fact that this
Asian nation is the fifth largest in world by population and
has a large untapped resource base. It is a member of OPEC
with over 30 Western oil companies engaging in exploration
and production. Also, it is situated on the strategic water-
ways which connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Moreover,
it is involved in planning programs through ASEAN and may,
in the near future, emerge as the natural leader of this
regional grouping. Further, Indonesia has a large extent of
trade and interdependency with Japan, This takes on added
importance to American businesses when one considers the re-
lations between the U.S. and Japan. Indonesia's per-capita
GNP is among the lowest in the world, but in the last eight
years she was excelled in programs for economic growth.
Indonesia has an abundant source of oil \\^hich is her
most important natural resource. Actually, her proven oil
reserves are roughly 15 billion barrels. Indonesia has other
natural resources also, including very fertile soil and an
^^Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN- -Economics , the Key to Success,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 1977, p. 34.
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excellent climate for agriculture, substantial forest re-
84
sources, promising amounts of minerals, and natural gas.
American investment in this nation tends to be capital
intensive. The firms coming to Indonesia attempt to reproduce
a highly mechanized working environment such as they are
o c
accustomed to in the United States. Perhaps the best plan
would be to concentrate on labor-intensive industries and
draw from the tremendous population existing on these islands.
Indonesia's economy shows strengthening and growing potential.
Future trade prospects with the United States look good, pro-
viding the U.S. does not upset these relations with degrading
statements about 'Human Rights'. There appears to be more
bilateral trade with Indonesia than through any agreements
with the Asian association.
C. U. S. Economic Interests in Thailand Through ASEAN
Thailand enjoys a substantial trade exchange with the
United States. In 1977, Bangkok entered into a joint ASEAN
memorandum which was sent to the United States government,
asking Washington to retain the tax deferral system which
works to the benefit of the ASEAN states.
84Guy Pauker, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future
Foreign Policy, April 7, 1976.
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At present Thailand must be concerned with its govern-
ment's ability to widen the support of its base by decreasing
poverty among the minority ethnic groups in the Northeastern
and Southern portions of the nation. Her major concentration
however, has been in facing the security threat along her
borders. Once this has been brought under control, the nation
will be better able to concentrate on her economic structure
and enter more fully into the ASEAN cooperation towards rapid
economic and regional development.
D. U. S. Economic Interests in the Philippines Islands
Through ASTM
Most of the economic dealings in the Philippines were
established in years past prior to the formation of ASEAN.
In 1977, she came forth with an ASEAN proposal to coerce the
United States into taking on a leading role in North-South
Dialogue discussions. Concurrently, the Philippines confront-
ed the Americans at an ASEAN meeting held in Manila that samie
year, with a series of requests for tariff and quota con-
cessions for export products, including mahogany and palm
oil. The Americans countered with a desire for a non-discrim-
ination clause for U.S. investors in the Philippines; an old
agreement had formerly placed American businessmen on equal
8 7ground with Filipino businessmen.
^'^Rodney Tasker, "Reinforcing Ties With ASEAN," p. 129.
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E. U. S. Economic Interests in Malaysia Through ASEAN
Again, there has been little trade exchange with the
United States by Malaysia, other than the 'cash only' military
purchases of aircraft and equipment. However, Malaysia has
good potential for coordinating heavy trade exports of both
tin and agricultural products. Her main contribution through
ASEAN in an economic sense, has been in cooperating with the
other members in their proposals to the U.S., with regard to
trade and economic issues.
III. POLITICAL INTERESTS
All the ASEAN nations are public advocates of non-align-
ment and neutralization. However, each nation maintains
current ties to either the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, Europe, or Japan in some form or another. The
tentativeness and apparent lack of confidence of ASEAN poli-
tical moves is a reflection of the youth and inexperience of
this regional cooperation.
The questions facing the Washington planners appear to
be twofold: (1) Would American disengagement from the South-
east Asian region, along with Sino-U.S. detente, offer the
opportunity to venture further into a U.S. Alliance structure
in the region? Or, (2) should the United States try to
associate itself with those Asian governments which represent
change and a commitment to social justice, no matter what
their international alignments may be? The Vietnamese
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expansion and Soviet move into Afghanistan may be a sufficient
enough communist threat which could pressure Washington to
opt for further involvement into an alliance structure in the
region, particularly if Europe can be persuaded to do the
same.
The five ASEAN nations do not want to create a vacuum
which would tempt one of the superpowers to move in. But the
recent Soviet and Vietnamese acts of aggression have caused
the United States to sharpen its focus on ASEAN. Washington
has pledged a strong commitment to the area; the recent place-
ments of military equipment into Thailand is one attempt by
America to impress upon the five governments that its post-
Vietnam war apathy toward the area is 'water over the bridge'.
To further substantiate U.S. concern, Washington has also
increased military sales credits to Malaysia and Indonesia,
and in early 1979, entered into a new five-year agreement with
8 8
the Philippines to maintain its military bases there. As
the Association strengthens itself through better cooperation
and communications, the Washington planners may find them-
selves having to deal more through the regional grouping, and
less through bi- or multi-lateral arrangements.
IV. CULTURAL/SOCIAL INTERESTS
Little could be found to indicate that the United States
has been involving itself over relations in this catagory
88
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through the association. The most which seems to be evident
is the U.S. has sent representatives to their summit meetings
and has been involved as a United Nations member, in pro-







The three objectives of this paper have been to (1) deter-
mine the extent of the United States' national interests in
ASEAN; (2) determine whether the Association plays a relevant
part in the policies and decisions Washington sets over this
region, and (3) establish whether the U.S. should deal in its
nationsl interests through ASEAN or on a bi-lateral basis
with each respective ASEAN nation.
Chapters Two and Three described the extent of America's
national interests and also what proportion of these interests
were being dealt directly through the ASEAN grouping. If one
were to construct a graph of the U.S. national interests which
have been found and described in the preceding text, certain
data becomes evident: First, it is apparent the United States
has been dealing with the region primarily on a country-to-
country basis rather than through the association. This may
be in part due to the original linkages formed with each nation
before the birth of this association in 1967. Secondly, it
has only recently become apparent, that mutual trust and com-
mittments between the member states, have become their
primary concerns exceeding those of external committments.
Nationalism had taken priority over regionalism during the




Bi-lateral agreements and arrangements reign prevalent
in security. It is becoming evident however, that the ASEAN
states are increasing their defense cooperation out of fear
of Soviet Communism and Vietnamese aggression. Their ties
with Japan and China have also shown signs of strengthening.
And now, for the first time in decades, the desire for a firm
United States committment is unanimous.
It would benefit the United States to shift the policy
of dealing with each nation as an individual and begin to
construct its agreements through the Association of Southeast
Asian Nation. This would accomplish two things: first, the
association itself would become more unified, since all its
security arrangements with the United States would then be
conducted on a regional basis. Second, from a global per-
spective, the unification of the nations concerning security
matters would have more of an impact. The Communist nations
would be more hesitant to infringe upon any part of the ter-
ritory from fear of retribution from the rest of the area.
The combined strength of all the member nations would have
significantly more impact. Other regional associations (such
as ANZUS) would be more inclined to establish ties with ASEAN,
In addition to the two obvious benefits, Washington might
find it easier to gain approval for appropriations when
setting up military assistance and aid for one region, rather
than five separate countries, in view of the unified goals
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and stability our planners would perceive the association
to create.
II. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
This study has shown that economic interests by the United
States have been more frequent on a nation-to-nation basis,
rather than the Americans working through ASEAN. This has
been contrary to the dealings ASEAN is conducting with both
the European Economic Community and Japan. Both of those
areas/nations are beginning to work directly through the
association.
If the United States were to work directly with the assoc-
iation, the region would probably have the most to gain. It
would have better bargaining power on pricing, quantity,
tariffs, quotas, and other trade barrier disintegration. The
rest of the Less Developed Countries of the world would have
this grouping to exemplify methods for developing themselves
more rapidly. Unified, the nations and areas in the world,
which may have similar products or labor potential. In
effect, they would become more competitive.
Conversely, if the United States were to continue to deal
with the region as they have been doing, (choosing to ignore
the association in all but rhetoric and dialogue about their
economic interests) , the association stands to lose the poten-
tial for economic gains. The U.S. is creating intra-regional
rivalry and competition over many of their similar products
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and resources. American businessmen can deal with each nation
to establish maximum gains more discreetly. It in effect
breaks down any cartel-like action which may be possible by
the group should they become unified. It is recommended,
therefore, that the United States continue to deal with the
region in the manner which provides her the optimum return.
While this policy should continue, the U.S. must also remain
flexible and prepare to change if the feelings against this
sort of maneuver become too strong and a potential falling




Again, the United States has been dealing primarily with
each individual nation on a case by case basis concerning all
political matters. Yet there appears to be a gradual shift
in this trend in that the U.S. now has representatives attend-
ing all of the ASEAN conferences and speaking in her behalf.
This indicates that Washington has begun to recognize ASEAN
as a true regional concern. ASEAN has been attempting to
shelve its nationalism in order to come up with enhanced sec-
urity and economic gains. It is the opinion of this author
that the shift of the United States - to deal with the assoc-
iation on political topics - is beneficial to both sides. It
shows concern for the region as a whole rather than for mere
local trouble spots which may show up from time to time.
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Should the Communists be forced to realize that any section
of this region is as vital as the other and just as capbly
supported by a united defense, both the Americans and the
nations of ASEAN will carry greater impetus when facing the
Communist Bloc.
IV. CULTURAL/SOCIAL INTERESTS
In this category, almost all such interests take place
through the individual nations. This is one area which would
be very difficult to handle through the association, for
there is a large range of cultural differences among the
member nations. If the Americans were to deal with such
topics through the grouping, it might indicate a level of
U.S. insensitivity over the respective differences displayed
by the countries. Furthermore, ties in this category are so
diverse that they cannot be easily placed under one grouping,
(ie. education, scientific research, ethnics, religions, etc.),
Continuation of the U.S. present manner of handling this
category is recommended.
ASEAN has become a sound organization and the ties which
have lent themselves to strengthening it still exist (such
as external threat, need for economic development, a new
feeling of regionalism, and so on) . The Washington planners
must be made more aware of this shifting tide toward unity
and recognize optimum means to deal with the association which
will be mutually beneficial. This study has shown how the
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U.S. is currently dealing with this region in four important
categories, (Security, Politics, Economics, and Cultural/
Social). More importantly, it presents observations which
can provide a means for planners to determine the most effect'
ive manner in which to negotiate United States' interests
in this region - through the countries themselves or directly





The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Thailand;
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common
problems among the countries of South-East Asia and convinced
of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of re-
gional solidarity and cooperation;
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action
to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the
spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute
towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;
CONSCIOUS that in a increasingly interdependent world, the
cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic
well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding,
good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the
countries of the region already bound together by ties of
history and culture;
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share
a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and
social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful
and progressive national development, and that they are deter-
mined to ensure their stability and security from external
interference in any form of manifestation in order to preserve
their national identies in accordance with the ideals and
aspirations of their peoples;
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain
only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned
and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to
subvert the national independence and freedom of States in




FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional
Cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be




SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association
shall be:
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and
cultural development in the region through joint endeavours
in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to streng-
then the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community
of South-East Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding
respect for justice and rule of law in the relationship
among countries of the region and adherence to the principles
of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on
matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural
technical scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of train-
ing and research facilities in the educational, professional,
technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utiliza-
tion of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of
their trade including the study of the problems of inter-
national commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation
and communication facilities and the raising of the living
standards of their peoples;
6. To promote South-East Asian studies;
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing
international and regional organizations with similar aims
and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooper-
ation among themselves.
THIRD, that to carry out the aims and purposes, the
following machinery shall be established:
1. Annual Meeting fo Foreign Ministers, which shall be by
rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special
Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required.
2. A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign
Minister of the host country or his representative and having
as its members the accredited Ambassadors of the other member
countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between
Meeting of Foreign Ministers;
3. Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists
and officials on specific subjects;
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4. A National Secretariat in each member country to carry-
out the work of the Association on behalf of that country
and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign
Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other committees
as may hereafter be established.
FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to
all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the
aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.
FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will
of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together
in friendship and cooperation, and through joint efforts and
sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the
blessing of peace, freedom and prosperity.
DONE in Bangkok on the Eigth Day of August in the Year
One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven.








(Signed) (TUN ABDUL RAZAK)
Deputy Prime Minister,






FOR SINGAPORE (Signed) (S. RAJARATNAM)
Minister for Foreign
Affairs
FOR THAILAND (Signed) (THANAT KHOMAN)
Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
Source: Reproduced from Department of Information, Republic
of Indonesia, "The ASEAN Declaration." Contained in
Indonesia's Special Issue 039/1969, The Association
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Note: Includes the Middle East and Oceania, but not Australia
2Almost all U.S. sources for these materials, except
those indicated, are in Canada and Latin America.
America's Asian chromium source is Turkey.
Source: Excerpted from data in Allan E. Goodman's "The
Threat from the Third World: Mounting Challenge
to U.S. and Western Economic Superiority?" In
Proceedings of the National Security Affairs
Conference July 17-19, 1978. National Defense
University Equivalence, Sufficiency, and the
International Balance [Washington, D. C. : (Tovern-
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